A low-effort data mining approach to labeling network event records in a WLAN is proposed. The problem being addressed is often observed in an AI and data mining strategy to network intrusion detection, i.e., need for a training dataset of network event records that are labeled as either normal or an intrusion type. Given the dynamic nature of intrusion detection, such a dataset is often very large in size, especially in a WLAN where several devices communicate with the network in a rather adhoc manner. The large size of such a training dataset adversely affects the effort required by the domain expert in labeling all the training dataset records. A clustering algorithm is initially used to form groups of similar network events, which the expert analyzes and assigns each cluster to one of four classes: definite intrusion, possibly intrusion, probably normal, and definite normal. An ensemble classifier is then used to cleanse the labeled dataset of likely mislabeling errors made by the expert. This combined strategy results in the expert examining only a very small proportion of the given intrusion detection training dataset. The proposed approach is investigated with network traffic data obtained from a real-world WLAN. An ensemble classifier-based intrusion detection model built with the labeled training dataset yields good prediction accuracy.
Introduction
The security and event monitoring of computer networks has become an integral component of our technology infrastructure with the widespread use of local area networks and the Internet. This is caused in part due to the increased dependence on computer networks for both business and personal use. Ensuring computer network security is particularly important in the case of wireless local area networks (WLANs) since prior network security protocols were primarily geared toward wired computer networks.
Network intrusion detection research has generally focussed on wired local area networks (Khoshgoftaar & Abushadi 2004; Lee, Stolfo, & Mok 1999) . Given the widespread and growing use of wireless local area networks (WLANs) today there is an increasing interest in ensuring their security. Current WLANs are generally based on the IEEE 802.11 standard which has known security flaws (Lough 2001) . The TCP and IP protocols were originally designed for wired networks and lack a vision of mobility and wireless communication. Related efforts to improve the security of wireless networks have generally focussed on enhancing the network architecture or protocols and on detecting specific attacks (Bellardo & Savage 2003) .
Malicious activity in a computer network can compromise the integrity of the network resulting in the loss of privacy and sensitive information. To counter harmful events in a computer network, security related network and access heuristics can be incorporated into network access rules and access controls for providing network security. However, such security mechanisms have been known to be breakable due to, in part, the predictability of their behavior. A data mining and knowledge discovery strategy to the network intrusion detection problem provides another level of security analysis, i.e., learning the behaviors of network users by mining data from their network access trails and activities.
Some recent research works in network security and intrusion detection have focussed on data mining and machine learning techniques for network intrusion detection (Florez, Bridges, & Vaughn 2002; Khoshgoftaar, Gao, & Ibrahim 2005; Lee, Stolfo, & Mok 1999) . However, considerable practical challenges still remain as open issues including intrusion detection in wireless networks, labeling network event records for machine learning and real-time data mining models for intrusion detection. In this study, we focus on the practical problem of labeling network traffic records in a training dataset needed when applying data mining and machine learning techniques for intrusion detection in WLANs.
A typical data mining and machine learning approach to network intrusion detection requires a training dataset of network event (traffic) records labeled as either normal or one of many attack types. This dataset can then be used to build a machine learner to model the relationship between network event attributes and event behavior, i.e., normal or intrusive. The size of such a dataset is generally very large and prohibitive when employing expert-based labeling of the records. This is due to the large number of network events one has to track in the context of intrusion detection. For example, the landmark intrusion detection training dataset of the DARPA intrusion detection project contained about 500,000 records (Khoshgoftaar & Abushadi 2004; Lee, Stolfo, & Mok 1999) in the training dataset.
Since a training dataset for intrusion detection generally requires labeling of records as normal or an attack type, the domain expert is primarily responsible for assigning the labels based on inspection of records. Considering the DARPA example, one can see why it can be prohibitive for an expert to label such a large number of network records. The time and effort required to label a relatively large training dataset can be practically infeasible. If some automated labeling assistant is not available, manual inspection and labeling of records would be quite tedious and erroneous due to the laborious nature of the task.
Our study presents an innovative approach by which the number of network records the expert has to examine is a relatively small proportion of the given dataset. The case study presented shows that a very large dataset of almost 13,000 network event records is labeled by inspecting fewer than 10% of the instances. The proposed approach is a hybrid (combination) of data clustering and data cleansing processes with minimal expert inspection for labeling. A clustering algorithm (online k-means (Zhong 2005) ) is used to form relatively coherent clusters which the expert examines as a whole to label records as one of four classes: Red (definite intrusion), Yellow (possibly intrusion), Blue (probably normal), and Green (definite normal). These expertassigned labels are then evaluated by an ensemble classifierbased data cleansing approach, which assists the expert in identifying mislabeling errors during the previous step.
A case study of network event records obtained from a large real-world wireless network is used to present and evaluate the proposed low-effort network event labeling process. In addition, an ensemble-classifier trained on the freshly-labeled training dataset is applied to independent test datasets of network records from the same WLAN. The classifier is used to predict network events into one of three categories, i.e., Red, Yellow, and Blue or Green . The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed labeling process and the good generalization accuracy of the intrusion detection model. An almost 90% reduction in the likely effort required to label the entire training dataset is observed. This greatly reduces the overhead of labeling a given set of records for creating a training dataset to be used by an intrusion detection model.
The rest of the paper continues in the next section with a case study description of the real-world WLAN, followed by details on the proposed combined labeling approach and the intrusion detection model. The subsequent section discusses the empirical results, while the final section concludes our work including some future research directions.
WLAN Case Study Description
The wireless network logs used in our case study correspond to trace data collected from a real WLAN over a period of several weeks (Balazinska & Castro 2003) . The network consisted of over 170 access points spread over three physical locations. The WLAN, operating in the infrastructure mode, consisted of clients connected via access points which were polled every five minutes using SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) to collect and record network traffic data. The network users were not aware of the data collection activity.
The raw data was summarized into connection-oriented records by pairing the MAC address that uniquely identifies the client with the access point to which it is connected. A dataset consisting of approximately 12,000 records for one week was thus obtained. Since all combinations of parent (i.e., access point) are preserved we believe that no useful information is lost during the data summarization process. Moreover, since we saved the connection between the original and the summarized records we can perform a backward trace. We also categorize the time of the record into 'weekday' and 'weekend', and discretize the time of day to 'morning', 'day', and 'night' based on the traffic load distribution over a 24 hours period.
The other categorical variables, such as access point, are mapped to a number for clustering purposes. The MAC address, client IP and actual name of the access point are anonymized in the data. Thus, we cannot compare the MAC address to the list of actual MAC addresses based on the naming conventions. We believe that attacks related to MAC addresses, such as MAC address spoofing, can be modeled and captured with the other metrics used in our study. The extracted metrics consisted of nine numeric network traffic attributes (features) and three categorical attributes. In our study, only the nine numeric features are considered (Table 1) -it was found that better initial expert-based labeling was obtained without the categorical variables.
Upon data preprocessing, we obtained four datasets, each corresponding to one of four weeks -named Week 1, Week 2, Week 3, and Week 4. The Week 1 dataset contains 12,924 instances, Week 2 dataset contains 11,851 instances, Week 3 dataset contains 11,926 instances, and Week 4 dataset contains 11,743 instances. As summarized above the final datasets were obtained after expending considerable effort on the acquisition, processing, and analysis of the wireless network logs. The Week 2, Week 3, and Week 4 datasets are used as test data to evaluate the intrusion detection model trained using the labeled Week 1 training dataset.
Approach for Labeling Network Events
The first step in our labeling process is applying a clustering algorithm to group the records of the large unlabeled training dataset into coherent groups. A commonly used clustering algorithm, k-means, is used in our study. We use the online k-means clustering algorithm to group the network records since it has been shown to outperform standard kmeans (Zhong 2005) . The expert is asked to label each cluster, thereby its instances, as one of four labels: Red (definite intrusion), Yellow (possibly intrusion), Blue (probably normal), and Green (definite normal). The working assumption in clustering network records is that events with similar attributes are likely to exhibit similar behavior (Portnoy, Eskin, & Stolfo 2001) .
In addition to his domain knowledge, additional knowledge available to the expert for labeling are the cluster centroid (attribute means of instances in a cluster) and basic statistics of each cluster. In addition to inspecting cluster centroids, the expert is free to manually inspect specific instances where labeling was not possible based only on centroids and basic statistics of clusters.
A given instance can be labeled as: Red, if it is very likely to be an attack which necessitates triggering an alarm within the intrusion detection system; Yellow, if it is possibly an attack that can be logged for offline inspection; Blue, it is likely to represent unusual but non-intrusive behavior; and Green, if it is very likely to represent normal network behavior. A generic classification of network events is useful when a precise spectrum of known attacks is not available.
At the end of the first step, all instances in the training dataset have been labeled by inspecting a relatively small proportion of the total number of instances in the dataset. The next step applies an iterative ensemble classifier-based data cleansing process to assist the expert in identifying likely mislabeling errors made in the previous step. We consider an ensemble classifier consisting of seven learners: C4.5, Alternating Decision Tree, Random Forest, RIPPER, Logistic Regression, Instance-Based Learning, and Naive Bayes. These learners are implemented in Weka (Witten & Frank 1999) , a data mining and machine learning freeware. The rationale for using a seven-learner ensemble is based on our prior experiences with ensemble classifiers and characteristics of the domain data. The following describes our iterative data cleansing process with an ensemble-classifier of seven learners.
1. Create four two-group datasets each consisting of a subset of the Week 1 training dataset, i.e., Red vs. Green, Yellow vs. Green, Red vs. Yellow, and Red and Yellow vs. Blue and Green . Hence, each group in the derived dataset contains all Week 1 instances from either one or more of the labeled categories.
2. Train classification models based on the different learners of the ensemble classifier and predict the labels of the dataset (of Step 1) using 10-fold cross validation.
3. A given network record that is misclassified by learners is presented to the expert for manual inspection. We consider , implying if two or more models misclassify an instance, it undergoes an inspection. The value of reflects the level of conservativeness (or aggressiveness) desired in cleansing the data from mislabeling errors.
The expert inspects the attributes of an instance detected in
Step 3 and provides the corrected (if necessary) label.
5. Replace the existing labels with the newly assigned labels, and repeat the process from
Step 1 until the labels of no more than of the dataset are changed by the expert. The value selected is , representing a relatively very small proportion of instances in the given dataset. The iterative process stops when the expert changes the labels of no more than 0.10% of instances in the given dataset. The error of mislabeling a Red instance as Green represents a missed opportunity of detecting a network attack, while mislabeling a Green instance as Red represents wasted time and effort in inspecting an actual normal network event. The listed order of these datasets represents the order of their execution with the above-described data cleansing process. Hence, once the first three datasets are executed the only remaining group that is not cleansed is Blue. This group in the Week 1 dataset is cleansed during the run with Dataset 4.
Results and Analysis Network Events Labeling Results
The clustering of Week 1 with online k-means was performed for a maximum of 50 clusters, similar to our prior study . Other maximum number of cluster sizes were considered in our analysis; however, the setting of clusters was deemed most appropriate for this case study. In addition to inspecting the centroids of each cluster the expert inspected those records for which the centroids alone were not conclusive enough for labeling. The resulting class distribution is shown in Table 2 . A total of 541 instances of Week 1 were inspected by the expert during this process, representing 4.19% of the Week 1 dataset.
The ensemble classifier based data cleansing process is performed for each of the four binary-class datasets ex- The data cleansing process with Dataset 1 consisted of 2 iterations, resulting in 13 record inspections with 11 instance labeling changes. From a security point of view, this is an important dataset as it entails correct identification of the definite-attack and definite-normal network events. The total number of records inspected (including those during the clustering and expert-labeling phase) after Dataset 1 was 554 or 4.29% of Week 1 dataset. The very small number of record inspection indicates that the initial labeling of Red and Green instances by the expert was fairly accurate. The resulting class distribution is summarized in Table 3 , which also shows the corresponding results for Dataset 2, Dataset 3, and Dataset 4.
Compared to Dataset 1, data cleansing with Dataset 2 (i.e., Red vs. Yellow instances) required 10 iterations, reflecting the difficulty in segregating and labeling Yellow and Green instances during clustering. An additional 293 instances were inspected during this stage, bringing the total number of expert inspections to 847 or 6.55% of the training dataset. Among the 293 new inspections, the labels of 269 records were changed. The number of Red instances did not change (see Table 3 ), while the number of Blue instances increased. The cleansing of Yellow and Green instances detected many instances in the two groups that should have been labeled Blue.
Data cleansing with Dataset 3 needed 6 iterations with 89 new instances selected for inspection. This dataset represents network events that should either trigger an alarm or at least be logged for investigation at a later time. A relative difference between these two types of records is important for maximizing the use of resources and treating potential threats according to importance. Among the 89 new inspections the labels of 49 instances were updated from their existing labels. Subsequently, the total number of Week 1 instances inspected by the expert stood at 936 or 7.24%. The data cleansing with Dataset 3 detected several instances that were mislabeled as Red, decreasing the total of Red instances to fewer than 300. The final dataset subjected to data cleansing is Dataset 4, a two-group dataset consisting of Red and Yellow records as one group (i.e., attack) and Blue and Green records as the other group (i.e., normal). This data cleansing run is focused toward detecting mislabeling errors within the Blue records. We note that unlike a run with Red vs. Yellow instances, a data cleansing process with Blue vs. Green is not performed. This is because normal instances (Blue or Green) will not be allocated resources for inspecting anomalous behavior. However, a data cleansing process with Blue vs. Green could potentially be achieved by creating another subset, say Dataset 5, consisting of Blue and Green instances of Week 1.
The data cleansing process with Dataset 4 required 4 iterations, resulting in 232 additional inspections by the expert. Among these, the labels of 128 instances were updated by the expert. Consequently, the cumulative inspection effort required by the expert consisted of 1168 instances or only 9.03% of the entire Week 1 dataset. The final class-based distribution for the dataset is shown in Table 3 . The dataset now consists of 295 (or 2.3%) Red, 1108 (or 8.6%) Yellow, 902 (or 7.0%) Blue and 10619 (or 82.2%) Green records.
The completion of all four data cleansing runs implies that the entire Week 1 dataset has been labeled according to our network event labeling process, a hybrid process of data clustering and data cleansing processes with limited expert inspection. About 13,000 network records were labeled by having the expert inspect fewer than 10% of the total training dataset. This is a practical benefit to the domain expert when creating a intrusion detection dataset for training a machine learner. 
Intrusion Detection Modeling Results
An ensemble classifier is trained using the newly-labeled training dataset of our case study. The prediction accuracy of this intrusion detection model provides an insight into the further benefits of the proposed low-effort labeling process. Since an IDS is primarily interested in detecting network events that are likely attacks, we obtain a dataset consisting of Week 1 instances but re-labeled into three groups -Red, Yellow, and Blue or Green . The latter group is denoted as "Normal", representing records that are either definite or probably normal network events.
The ensemble classifier consists of seven learners which include all the learners used during the data cleansing process except for Alternating Decision Trees -a three group classification is not feasible with ADTs. Instead, we use PART which is a rule-based learner implemented in Weka (Witten & Frank 1999) . The ensemble classifier learners are now C4.5, PART, Random Forest, RIPPER, Logistic Regression, Instance-Based Learning, and Naive Bayes.
We define some notations used to present the intrusion detection results. The "R-Detection Rate" and "Y-Detection Rate" respectively represent the accurate prediction of Red and Yellow records: e.g., if all 200 expert-assigned Red instances are predicted as Red, R-Detection Rate is 100%. The "T-Detection Rate" is the overall prediction accuracy of Red and Yellow instances, i.e., percentage of both Red and Yellow instances that are accurately classified. The "NFalse Positive Rate" is the percentage of Normal instances misclassified as either Yellow or Red. The "Y-False Positive Rate" is the percentage of Yellow instances predicted as Red. The "T-False Positive Rate" is the combined false positive rate for Yellow and Normal instances, i.e., a Normal instance predicted as Yellow or Red, or a Yellow instance predicted as Red.
Cross-validation results of the trained intrusion detection model are shown in Table 4 (also shows the prediction for Week 2). The near-perfect overall detection rate (T-Detection Rate) with a very low overall false positive rate (T-False Positive Rate) validates our data cleansing and network events labeling process. A matrix-style summary of the misclassifications for the training dataset is shown in Table 5 . A noteworthy observation is that no Normal instances were misclassified as Red, and no Red instances were misclassified as Normal. Any misclassification between these two classes is severe, i.e., either a missed opportunity to catch an attack early or wasted resources by inspecting normal traffic.
The Week 2, Week 3 and Week 4 datasets of the case study Since it is likely that none of the three classes may attain a simple majority of the seven learners, i.e, four or more, a test data instance is assigned the class label predicted by the largest number of models.
In the case of a tie, we opted to assign the instance a label of the higher severity among the competing classes. This was done to be rather cautious in predicting labels for intrusion detection: e.g., if an instance is predicted as Red by 1 model, Yellow by 3 models and Normal by 3 models, we choose Yellow as the predicted label, since it is the higher severity of the two tied classes. Similarly, if an instance is predicted to be Red by 3 models, Yellow by 3 models and Normal by 1 model, we choose Red, which is the higher severity level among Red and Yellow classes.
The actual labels of the test datasets were obtained from two prior ensemble-classifier based case studies (those results are not presented) of the WLAN. Those studies were performed after the proposed combined approach for labeling the Week 1 dataset. The first study involved predicting network events as either Red or non-Red (Yellow, Blue and Green instances), while the second study involved predicting the records as either Intrusion (Red and Yellow instances) or Normal (Blue and Green instances). We note that these two case studies involved a two-group classification; hence, the ADT algorithm is not substituted with the PART learner.
The actual labels of the test data instances in both case studies were obtained as follows: if at least one of the seven learners predicted a test data instance as Red (in the first case study) or Intrusion (in the second case study), then that instance is inspected by the expert. In the case of a complete consensus among the seven learners and where the predicted class is Normal, the actual class is assumed to be Normal. An instance that is predicted as Red (first case study) or Intrusion (second case study) by all seven learners is also inspected by the expert. Upon a careful inspection of all such instances the expert either maintains the prediction as the actual label or changes the same. Such a strict inspection approach with the test datasets was taken to minimize labeling errors and obtain a high confidence in the obtained intrusion detection model.
The intrusion detection results for the Week 2 dataset Table 5 , where once again there is perfect classification between the Red and Normal classes of network traffic records. The increase in misclassifications is seen when the Yellow class is involved -this may be expected since Yellow instances can be relatively similar to both Red and Normal instances. The prediction results for the Week 3 test dataset is shown in Table 6 , where the prediction of Red instances is 100% as was the case for Week 2. The misclassification numbers for Week 3 are shown in Table 7 -compared to corresponding numbers for Week 2, the only marked difference is in the numbers of Yellow instances misclassified as Normal. The intrusion detection results for Week 4 (Tables 6 and 7) are relatively similar to Week 2 and Week 3. However, compared to the two previous weeks where no Red instances were misclassified, 1 Red instance was misclassified in Week 4. Since this instance is misclassified as Yellow, it would be logged for offline investigation.
Conclusion
An intrusion detection machine learner can only be trained after the expert (or equivalent) labels all records in the training dataset. This tedious and error-prone task of labeling network traffic records is exacerbated by the large size of such a dataset. We presented an innovative strategy for greatly reducing the number of instances the expert has to inspect for labeling a large dataset of network event records.
Network traffic data obtained over multiple weeks from a real-world WLAN is used in our study. The results demonstrate the benefit of the proposed low-effort labeling process of network event records. A very large training dataset of almost 13,000 instances is labeled by inspecting only about 10% of the dataset. This is a good reduction in the overhead of labeling network event records. An intrusion detection model trained using the assigned labels shows good generalization accuracy in predicting intrusions in three independent test datasets obtained from the WLAN.
Some future research directions include investigating other clustering algorithms and techniques to further reduce the expert's involvement during the labeling process. Toward the latter objective, methods similar to query-bycommittee approaches may be useful. Additional case studies would further validate the proposed approach.
